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EMPLOYEE MEDICAL RECORDS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Privacy, thus, is control over knowledge about oneself. But it
is not simply control over the quantity of information abroad;
there are modulations in the quality of the knowledge as well.
We may not mind that a person knows a general fact about us,
and yet feel our privacy invaded if he knows the details.1
The Constitution implicitly guarantees an individual the right to
privacy.' The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an individual has a
constitutional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters'
I Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (footnote omitted).
2 The Constitutional right to privacy is not identifiable in any amendment specifically.
Rather, the right exists somewhere in the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights and the guaran-
tee of personal liberty in the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-54 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965). Griswold was the first
Supreme Court decision to discuss a composite right to privacy in the Constitution. See 381
U.S. at 481-86. Cf., e.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 374 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("right to privacy" exists in fourth amendment's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-63 (1958) ("right to privacy"
exists in first amendment's right to be free in association); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886) ("right to privacy" exists in fifth amendment's right to refuse to incriminate
self in criminal prosecutions). The Griswold Court recognized that the "zones of privacy" ex-
isting in the Constitution are applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
even though no such right is recognized explicitly by the Constitution. See 381 U.S. at
484-86. Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, concurred
with the Griswold majority but used the ninth amendment to find a right to privacy to be a
fundamental personal right. Id. at 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The ninth amendment
provides: "The enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Justice Goldberg
was of the opinion that the concept of liberty protects fundamental personal rights and it is
not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights. 381 U.S. at 486. The Court later
adopted Justice Goldberg's broader formulation of the right to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at 153; see generally Clark, Constitutional Sources of the Penumbral Right to Privacy,
19 VILL. L. REV. 833 (1974); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. Civ. RTS.-Civ. LIB. L.
REV. 233 (1977); Kauper, Penumbras Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten. The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965).
3 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). The Whalen Court noted that the
privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters was first recognized by Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States when he said the "right to be let alone [is] the right
most valued by civilized men." Id., at 599 n.25 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928)); see California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (at some point, governmental intrusion into individual's financial affairs would
impinge on legitimate expectation of privacy); id. at 88-89 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (one's
bank account falls within fourth amendment "expectation of privacy," because it mirrors his
finances, interests, debts, way of life, and civic commitments); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("first amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion").
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and being able to make important personal decisions independently
Thus, because of the personal and sensitive nature of information con-
tained in medical records, the Supreme Court has-recognized implicitly
an individu'al's qualified privacy right in maintaining the confidentiality
of his medical records., When extending that right to medical records
maintained by an employer, however, the lower courts have been incon-
sistent in their determination of the proper Supreme Court standard
regarding whether an individual's privacy right has been violated.'
The health care profession is under an ethical and statutory duty to
retain an individual's medical confidences. 7 The protection exists to en-
courage a patient's candor in the physician-patient relationship, thereby
enabling the physician to diagnose and treat an individual properly
without embarrassing the patient through indiscriminate disclosure.' An
' See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 598-600. The Whalen Court noted that the privacy in-
terest in making certain important decisions independently was recognized in the series of
Supreme Court decisions concerned with marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing
and education. Id. at 600 n.26 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (procreation); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (con-
traception); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (education and child rearing);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (education)).
See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318-20 & n.16 (1979); Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 598-602 (1977); text accompanying notes 25-36, 43-49 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 58-62 infra.
See text accompanying notes 8-18 infra.
' See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 & 801-02
(N.D. Ohio 1965); Division of Med. Quality, Bd. of Med. Quality Assur. v. Gherardini, 93 Cal.
App. 3d 669, 680, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61, 93 (1979); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 775-76,
79 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (1944) affd 296 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945); Fiscina, Informa-
tion A bout Patients: How Confidential?, 1980 LEGAL MEDICINE 247, 247 [hereinafter cited as
Fiscina].
Courts have considered whether a physician-patient relationship is established in the
corporate setting. In general, for a physician-patient privilege to attach, the parties must
have established a relationship. See, e.g., Branch v. Wilkinson, 198 Neb. 649, -, 256
N.W.2d 307, 312 (1977); Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va. 630, 632-33; 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977).
Further, because the physician-patient relationship is predicated on consent, a physician is
not liable for negligence or breach of contract unless a relationship exists. See Ahnert v.
Wildman, - Ind. App. -, 376 N.E.2d 1182, 1185-86 (1978); Lyons v. Grether, 218 Va.
630, 632-33, 239 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1977); Shrank, Determinism and the Law of Consent-Re-
formulation of Individual Accountability for Choices Made Without "Free Wil " 12 SuF-
FOLK L. REV. 796, 808-09 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Shrank] (physician-patient relationship
based on consent). Judicial decisions have held that a physician does not owe the same duty
of care to an employee examined on behalf of an employer as he owes his private patients.
See Keene v. Wiggins, 69 C.A.3d 308, 313-15, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3, 6-7 (1977); Hoover v. William-
son, 236 Md. 250, -, 203 A.2d 861, 262-63 (1964); Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich. App. 644,
646-47 & n.2, 237 N.W.2d 595, 597 & n.2 (1975). No protected physician-patient relationship
exists because the company, not the employee, hired the physician. Rogers v. Horvath, 65
Mich. App. at 646-47, 237 N.W.2d at 597. Nevertheless, if the employee voluntarily seeks
treatment from a company physician and the physician provides treatment, courts may hold
that a relationship does exist. See Rogers v. Horvath, 65 Mich. App. at 647, 237 N.W.2d at
597; 45 Fed. Reg. 35233 (May 23, 1980). Cf. Armstrong v. Morgan, 545 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1976) (company physician has no duty to discover disease, but has duty not to in-
jure plaintiff employee). If no relationship arises out of a medical examination required and
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attending physician's duty not to disclose his patient's confidences ob-
tained incident to the relationship is an implied ethical obligation that
originated in the Hippocratic Oath.' The Oath's duty is echoed in the
American Medical Association's Code of Ethics0 and some state licens-
ing statutes."1 A physician's breach of confidentiality may constitute un-
professional conduct resulting in revocation or suspension of the physi-
cian's license.'
2
The evidentiary doctrine of confidential or privileged communication
between a patient and his physician did not exist at common law."3 To
protect a patient's medical confidences in judicial or quasi-judicial pro-
paid for by the patient's employer, no physician-patient privilege should exist regarding
medical information generated from that examination. The American Occupational Medical
Association, however, established a "Code of Ethical Conduct for Physicians Providing Oc-
cupational Medical Services" to which many occupational physicians subscribe. See 45 Fed.
Reg. 35233 (May 23, 1980). The Code binds the occupational physician to traditional ethical
obligations. Id. at 35231; text accompanying notes 9-12 infra (professional ethics and
physician-patient privilege). See Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 105 L.R.R.M. 1379, 1380 (1980)
(even though company did not treat employee medical records as confidential, union could
not gain access without employee consent because records contain privileged information).
' See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, -, 287 So. 2d 824, 832 (1974); Kaiser, Patients'
Rights of Access To Their Own Medical Records: The Need For New Law, 24 BUFFALO L.
REV. 317, 317 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Kaiser]. The Oath of Hippocrates provides:
"Whatever in connection with my professional practice or not in connection with it I see or
hear in life of men which ought not be spoken abroad I will not divulge as recommending
that all should be kept secret." As quoted in Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
443 F. Supp. at 797.
10 AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957) (as quoted in S. REISER, A. DYCK, &
W. CURRAN, ETHICS IN MEDICINE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES & CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS, 39
(1977) [hereinafter cited as REISER].
" See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-24-90(7) (1977); IDAHO CODE § 54-1814(13) (Supp. 1979); MICH.
CoIP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16221(e)(ii) (1980).
1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-24-90(7) (1977); IDAHO CODE § 54-1418(13) iSupp. 1979); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.16221(e)(ii) (1980). An aggrieved patient may not be satisfied by the
penalty of suspension or revocation of a physician's license for breach of the ethical duty to
retain his patient's confidences. The patient, however, can seek damages for the breach
under three different tort theories: invasion of privacy, Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365
A.2d 792, 794-95 (Me. 1976); breach of implied contract of confidentiality, Home v. Patton,
291 Ala. 701, -, 287 So. 2d 824, 831 (1973); or defamation, Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d
191, - , 331 P.2d 814, 820-21 (1958). See A. SOUTHWICK, THE LAW OF HOSPITAL AND
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 317-33 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SOUTHWICK]. See generally
Elder, Physicians and Surgeons: Civil Liability For a Physician Who Discloses Medical In-
formation Obtained Within the Doctor-Patient Relationship, in a Nonlitigation Setting, 28
OKLA. L. REV. 658 (1975); Fiscina, supra note 8; Hanning & Brady, Extrajudicial Truthful
Disclosure of Medical Confidences: A Physician's Civil Liability, 44 DENVER L.J. 463 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hanning & Brady].
11 Unlike the attorney-client, husband-wife and minister-parishioner privileges, the
physician-patient evidentiary communication privilege was not established at common law.
See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498
F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, -, 287 So. 2d 824,
833-34 (1974) (McCall, J., dissenting); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 656-57, 389
S.W.2d 249, 251 (1965); SOUTHWICK, ,supra note 12, at 316; Hanning & Brady, supra note 12,
at 270-71.
19811 1269
1270 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
ceedings, some states have adopted privileged communication statutes.1"
Violation of a privileged communication statute may result in civil liability
to the patient.6
In addition to the physician's statutory and ethical obligation to re-
tain his patients' confidences, state and federal governments have
enacted regulations which create a duty on health care institutions to
protect medical records from disclosure except in specific limited cir-
cumstances. Violation of the regulations could lead to suspension or
revocation of the health care institution's license. 1 Further, hospital pro-
fessional standards require that medical records be kept confidential. 8
"' See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE, § 994 (West Supp. 1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02(B) (Page Supp. 1980). Generally, the privileged communication statutes apply to
pretrial discovery proceedings. Thus, the privilege is not confined to the actual trial. See
SOUTHWICK, supra note 12, at 336. The privileged communication statutes provide excep-
tions to the duty of confidence at trial, for example, no privilege exists when the patient's
medical condition is an issue at trial, CAL. EvID. CODE § 996 (West 1966), or in a criminal
proceeding, CAL. EVID. CODE § 998 (West 1966).
11 See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801-02 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 441, 443, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (1966).
" See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 405.1026 (1980) (Medicare regulations prohibiting participating
hospitals from disclosing medical records to unauthorized individuals); 10 N.Y. CODES,
RULES, REGS. Ch. V § 405.1026 (1977) (prohibiting unauthorized disclosure); 28 PA. CODE §
115.27 (1980) (prohibiting unauthorized disclosure).
A controversy currently exists over whether a patient should have access to his own
medical records. See generally Kaiser, supra note 9. In absence of a state statute granting a
patient access to his medical records, the holder of the records, for instance physician or
hospital, has the discretion to decide whether to release the records. The tendency in the
past has been not to release the information. See Kaiser, supra note 9, at 323-24. An increas-
ing number of states are recognizing an individual's right to his medical records, however.
Some states recognize the right by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-104, 4-105
(West 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 111, § 70 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 144.651
(Supp. 1981); see SOUTHWICK, supra note 12, at 307-08. Other states recognize the patient's
right of access by judicial decision. See, e.g., Wallace v. University Hosp. of Cleveland, 164
N.E.2d 917, 918 (1959) modified on other grounds, - Ohio App. - , 170 N.E.2d 261
(1960), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 487,-, 172 N.W.2d 459 (1961) (patient has property
right in information in records and is entitled to copy records). In either case, however, the
patient's right is qualified. He usually must demonstrate a legitimate need and purpose for
the information, and therefore cannot seek to view the records to satisfy his curiosity or to
"fish" for information. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-9-65 (1973); cf. MINN. STAT. § 144.651 (Supp.
1981) (no need for patient to demonstrate need or purpose for access to his own medical
records). Some courts and statutes, however, permit the attending physician to deny the pa-
tient access to information in the record that would not be in the patient's best health in-
terest. See Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d 1006, 1012
(8th Cir. 1965); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1711 (1980). The denial must be in the good
faith and professional judgment of the physician. See Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp. v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 350 F.2d at 1012. Under the same theory of concern for the patient's
health, some state statutes that do not allow a patient direct access to his medical records
permit the patient's representative access with the patient's written authorization. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1711 (1980).
"1 See Spears Free Clinic and Hosp. for Poor Children v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo.
147, -, 220 P.2d 872, 876 (1950) (statute authorizing state to revoke health institution's
license for noncompliance with statute is valid); SOUTHWICK, supra note 12, at 299.
"I JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
EMPLOYEE MEDICAL RECORDS
Despite the protection from unauthorized disclosure accorded medi-
cal records, public need for access ta the records sometimes overrides an
individual's concern for privacy.19 A physician is excused from the ethical
duty not to disclose patient's confidences when required by law or when
necessary to protect the welfare of an individual or community." Some
state statutes specify circumstances in which physicians and health care
institutions must release medical information to government bodies.21
Disclosure is required, for example, when mandatory reporting laws re-
quire notification to the public health department of contagious
diseases' and to the police of certain violent crimes." The information
that must be disclosed, however, is limited to the minimum amount need-
ed to satisfy the public interest.24 By limiting disclosure, the policy of
protecting an individual's privacy is maintained to the greatest extent
possible.
Patients have challenged, however, the constitutionality of state
statutes that allow government access to their medical information,
alleging that the constitution provides protection for physician-patient
communications.' In Whalen v. Roe,28 the Supreme Court considered the
HOSPITALS, 110 (1973). Failure to comply with accreditation standards could result in loss of
accreditation. Ic&; see SOUTHWICK, supra note 12 at 299-300.
" See text accompanying notes 20-24 infra.
" See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 9 (1957) (as quoted in REISER, supra note
10 at 39); text accompanying notes 22-23 (mandatory reporting statutes).
2 See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra.
, See, e.g., Tzx. Rav. CiV. STATE. art. 4445 (Vernon 1976) (veneral diseases); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 143.04 (West 1974) (communicable diseases); see SOUTHWICK, supra note 12, at
314.
, See, e.g., T.x. REV. Cir. STAT. art. 4447p (Vernon 1976) (physician required to report
incidents of gun shot wounds to police).
" Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 794-95, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564, 569 (1960) (plaintiff alleged
that physician was negligent for revealing more of patient's medical records than required
but court held that under circumstances physician was not negligent); Berry v. Moench, 8
Utah 2d 191, -. , 331 P.2d 814, 820 (1958) (physician has duty not to disclose more informa-
tion than necessary to satisfy outside interest in records); T.x. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 4445
(Vernon 1976) (statute requires name, address, age, sex & occupation of patients with
venereal disease).
" See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (upholding constitutionality of state
statute requiring patient's name, address, age, drug, dosage, physician and dispensing
pharmacy); Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding state policy requir-
ing access to medical records for medical misconduct investigation of physician); Division of
Med. Quality, Bd. of Med. Quality Assur. v. Gheradini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 681-82, 156 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 61-62 (1979) (court denied state medical board access to medical records for
medical misconduct investigation of physician unless could show patient's constitutional
rights not violated); Volkman v. Miller, 52 A.D.2d 146, -, 383 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-97 (1976),
affd, 41 N.Y.2d 946, 363 N.E.2d 355 (1977) (court upheld constitutionality of state's mental
hygiene law that authorized maintenance of psychiatric records in centralized computer
system); Schulman v. New York Health & Hosp. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 234, -, 342 N.E.2d 501,
307 (1975) (court upheld constitutionality of New York City's health code provision that re-
quires name and address of patient obtaining abortion).
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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constitutionality of a New York mandatory reporting statute.' The
Court held constitutionally valid the section of the New York Controlled
Substance Act of 1972 that permitted the state to record and store in a
centralized computer file the names and addresses of individuals treated
with prescription drugs that had an unlawful market.28
The plaintiff patients and physicians argued that the physician-
patient relationship is accorded constitutional protection.' They con-
tended that their constitutional right to privacy was violated by the
possibility that the information gathered would become publicly known'
The Whalen Court recognized that the Constitution provides an indivi-
dual with certain "zones of privacy. 31 Nevertheless, the Court found
that state agencies often require access to medical information and that
the access is not necessarily an impermissible invasion of privacy." The
Whalen Court did not balance the individuals' privacy interests against
the state's public interest in obtaining the requested information. In-
stead, the Court evaluated the reasonableness of the state's identifica-
tion requirement- and considered the evidence of potential harm to the
patients from disclosure.-' The Supreme Court held the statute to be a
reasonable exercise of New York's broad police powers.3 5 Moreover,
because the statute provided sufficient security to prevent improper
disclosure of the patient information, the Court held that the immediate
or threatened effect of the statute on the reputation or independence of
the patients was not sufficient to constitute an invasion of privacy.
30
I See i& at 591 (citing N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3331-3334, 3338-3339 (McKinney,
Supp. 1976-77)).
8 Id at 603-04.
Id. at 598-99. The plaintiffs alleged that the state's reporting requirement would af-
fect the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship and thereby prevent persons
from seeking treatment. Id. at 600. Further, the plaintiffs expressed concern that the
statute would make physicians reluctant to prescribe drugs that would trigger the report-
ing requirement even when their use would be medically indicated. Id. Thus, the plaintiffs
concluded the statute affected their ability to make decisions vital to their health care. Id.
' Id at 599-600.
3' Id. at 598-600.
1 Id at 602.
33 1& at 597-98.
, Id. at 600-04.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 603-04. The Whalen Court did not state explicitly when statutory security pro-
visions are sufficient. Rather, the Court merely stated that the prior record of New York
and other states that have similar statutes has not revealed a case in which a patient's
privacy was invaded. Id. at 601 & n.27. Thus, the Whalen Court said it could not assume
that the security provisions of the statute would be administered improperly. Id.
The Court examined §§ 3356 and 3371 which contain the security provisions of the
New York patient-identification statute. I& at 594-95 & n.12. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§
3356, 3371 (McKinney 1977). Section 3356 limits access to the information kept in the central
computer registry to practitioners associated with an addict's treatment and to agencies,
departments, or commissions authorized under mental hygiene laws to gather such informa-
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The Whalen decision is consistent with other judicial decisions con-
cerning computer storage of highly personal data."' In absence of an im-
mediate, physical, tangible injury, the Court has been reluctant to find
the accumulation of personal data to be a violation of an individual's
privacy right., The focus of the Whalen Court was not on whether the
government's access to patient information was an invasion of a funda-
mental right. 9 Rather, because the plaintiffs directed their allegations
toward possible leakage of the information as violative of their privacy
rights, the Court considered whether the statute was a reasonable exer-
cise of government responsibility over public welfare. 0 In addition, the
Supreme Court determined whether the plaintiffs were in immediate or
threatened danger of harm from disclosure.41 Finding that the state's
exercise of responsibility over the public was reasonable and that the
statute's security provisions were adequate, the Whalen Court found the
statute constitutional.42
In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,3 the Supreme Court broadened the
scope of Whalen when it considered whether an individual's privacy
rights are violated through unconsented access to his medical records. In
Detroit Edison, an employees' union, in preparation for arbitration of a
grievance, sought access to employee psychological testing data com-
piled by Detroit Edison.4' The company refused to release the data
tion. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3356(2) (1977). Section 3371 contains a broad prohibition
against disclosure of a patient's identification but also contains exceptions to this require-
ment. Disclosure is allowed, for example, intradepartmentally, pursuant to judicial sub-
poena or court order, and to a central registry established by the statute. Id. § 3371(1).
1 See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 76-77 (1974) (upholding constitu-
tionality of information-collection system created by Bank Secrecy Act of 1970); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972) (upholding constitutionality of Army's maintenance of data
collection and storage system containing information from Army's assistance in quelling
civil disorders in Detroit in 1967 and 1968).
1 See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 68-70 (1974); Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 11-16 (1972). In both Laird and California Bankers Ass'n, the Court stated that the
plaintiffs must allege that they had sustained or were in immediate danger of sustaining a
direct injury as a result of the challenged statute before the plaintiffs can have standing on
the constitutional question. 416 U.S. at 68-70; 408 U.S. at 11-16.
1 429 U.S. at 603. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). In Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court held the fundamental right of personal privacy includes the decision to have
an abortion. Id. at 154. The Court stated, however, that this right to privacy is not absolute
and must be weighed against state interests in regulation. Id. Consequently, the Supreme
Court held that where fundamental rights are involved, a state can limit those rights only
by demonstrating a "compelling state interest." Id. at 155-56. Further, the Court stated that
the state's regulation must be narrow so as to express only the legitimate state interest in
the regulation. Id.
40 429 U.S. at 597-98.
41 Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 597-98, 603-04.
" 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
" Id at 303-04.
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without the employees' consent. 5 The union filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that Detroit Edison
violated section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by
refusing to provide the psychological testing data to the union."6 Section
8(a)(5) imposes a duty on the employer to provide a labor union with rele-
vant information the union needs to properly perform the duties of the
employees' bargaining representative." The NLRB concluded that the
data were relevant to the grievance and ordered Detroit Edison to allow
the union access to the psychological testing data. 8 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the NLRB's decision and Detroit Edison appealed to the Supreme
Court. 9
In contrast to the Whalen Court, the Detroit Edison Court balanced
the employees' privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
psychological data against the union's need for access. 0 Recognizing the
sensitive nature of the records, the substantial evidence demonstrating
actual adverse affects from disclosure, and the lack of security provi-
sions to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the Court held that Detroit
Edison properly refused union access to the employees' psychological
data." The Court recognized that had the company granted the union un-
consented access under the circumstances, the company would have in-
vaded the employees' privacy rights.
2
By requiring a balancing test, the Detroit Edison Court recognized
that third party right of access to personal records is not absolute.
Where the third party demonstrates a legitimate need for access, the
Court will perform a balancing test weighing the individual's privacy in-
terest against the third party's need for access.5 3 The Court will consider
the personal nature of the requested information and evidence of sub-
stantial proof of immediate harm from disclosure.5 In addition, the Court
will determine whether reasonable alternatives to obtaining the infor-
mation are available, and whether adequate safeguards are provided to
protect the information from inadvertant or unauthorized disclosure.5
45 Id.
48 Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
', 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36
(1967) (employer has general obligation to provide information needed by bargaining
representative); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (employer must supply in-
formation relevant to bargaining process).
440 U.S. at 303-04.
" Id. at 304.
Id. at 317-20.
5 Id. at 319-20.
62 I1&
' Id. Cf. note 39 supra (Roe v. Wade compelling state interest test).
" 440 U.S. at 319-20.
' Id.; see text accompanying notes 113-116 infra (discussion of Detroit Edison's deter-
mination or existence of reasonable alternatives).
EMPLOYEE MEDICAL RECORDS
Recently, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA)' and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH)57 have requested access to employee medical records gathered
by the employer." The agencies' requests for access to medical records
have caused major litigation, further challenging the scope of the pa-
tient's right to privacy in medical records. 9 Third, Sixth, and D.C. Cir-
cuit opinions all recognize either explicitly or implicitly the employees'
constitutional right to privacy in the employer-gathered medical
records.' Nevertheless, all three circuits have held that the agencies' ac-
cess to medical records does not violate the employees' constitutional
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976). Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act) to assure employees of safe and healthful working conditions. Id § 651(b) (1976).
One of the means Congress provided to effectuate the policy was to authorize the Secretary
of Labor (Secretary) to promulgate rules setting occupational safety and health standards.
29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). The Secretary must enforce the standards through inspection and in-
vestigation of the workplace, 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1976), and through enforcement procedures
for facilities in violation of occupational safety and health standards, 29 U.S.C. §§ 658, 659
(1976).
5, 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976). Congress created the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) to effectuate the research policy of the OSH Act. NIOSH, for
example, conducts research to determine whether certain diseases have a causal connection
to the work environment. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651(b)(5), (6), (7), 669, 671 (1976). NIOSH is under the
direction of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976).
See note 59 infra.
' See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 572-73 (3d Cir. 1980);
General Motors Corp. v. Director of the Nat'l Inst. for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH), 636 F.2d 163, 164 (6th Cir. 1980); United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No.
79-1048, slip op. at 89 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980); United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F.
Supp. 1027, 1027-28 (E.D. Wis. 1980); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp.
821, 822-23 (S.D. W.Va. 1977).
Two district courts have considered whether an employee's privacy right is violated
by a company's compliance with a NIOSH subpoena for employee medical records. See
United States v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (E.D. Wis. 1980); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Finklea, 442 F. Supp. 821, 822-24 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). In both Allis-
Chalmers and du Pont, NIOSH sought enforcement of administrative subpoenas for
employee medical records pursuant to a health hazard evaluation NIOSH was conducting
at the defendants' plants. 498 F. Supp. at 1027-28; 442 F. Supp. at 823. Both courts
acknowledged that a right to privacy exists in employee medical records but refused to find
the employees' privacy rights abridged by unconsented production of the records. 498 F.
Supp. at 1029-31; 442 F. Supp. at 824-26. The Allis-Chalmers and de Pont courts relied
heavily on Whalen to hold that NIOSH's security provisions provide sufficient safeguards
so as not to pose a sufficient threat to violate the employees' privacy interests. 498 F. Supp.
at 1030-31; 442 F. Supp. at 825-26. The Allis-Chalmers court also noted that when an
employee .voluntarily proffers medical information for the employer's records, his expecta-
tion of privacy is diminished. 498 F. Supp. at 1031. See note 8 supra (creation and limitation
of physician-patient privilege with company physician).
' See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (ex-
plicitly recognizing constitutional privacy right in employee medical records); General
Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 363 F.2d 163, 166 (6th Cir. 1980) (implicitly recognizing
constitutional privacy right); United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip
op. 91-92 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 15, 1980) (implicitly recognizing constitutional privacy right).
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privacy interests.6' Further, each circuit has applied a different standard
derived from Whalen or Detroit Edison to reach its decision.2
In General Motors Corporation v. Director of NIOSH,1 the Sixth
Circuit relied exclusively on Whalen's adequate security test to hold
that enforcement of a NIOSH subpoena for production of employee medi-
cal records would not violate an individual's constitutional privacy
rights." NIOSH sought access to complete employee medical records
identifiable by employee, pursuant to a health hazard evaluation. 5 The
evaluation was initiated because of an outbreak of skin diseases among
the workers in part of the General Motors' plant.66 General Motors refus-
ed to release the medical records unless the employees authorized
release of their records. 7
Although the Sixth Circuit implicitly acknowledged that employee
medical records deserve constitutional privacy protection, the court
refused to find NIOSH's access to the records violative of the employees'
privacy rights." The court considered both General Motors' concern that
the information might be disclosed improperly and NIOSH's inability to
perform its statutory duty to investigate occupational diseases without
the records. 9 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the parties' interests in
the records were not mutually exclusive.76 The court held that both in-
terests could be satisfied if NIOSH had adequate security provisions to
protect the personal information from indiscriminate disclosure.7 1 In ad-
dition to ordering the district court to formulate and implement ap-
propriate safeguards on remand, the Sixth Circuit recommended that
" United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d at 580; General Motors Corp. v.
Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d at 165-66; United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No.
79-1048, slip op. at 91-92.
" See text accompanying notes 64, 80-81, 100 infra.
636 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 165-66. The Sixth Circuit did not question General Motors' standing to defend
the employees' constitutional rights. The court did reject, however, the plaintiff's argument
that enforcement of the subpoena would violate the physician-patient privilege established
by Ohio statute. Id. at 165. The court noted that the privilege does not exist at federal com-
mon law and that the Ohio privilege statute is not controlling in a federal question action.
Id.
" 636 F.2d at 164. Employees or their representative can request a health hazard
evaluation to investigate possible high toxic levels of substances in the workplace. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(f)(1) (1976). To assist in its investigation of the General Motors plant, NIOSH sub-
poenaed employee medical records pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(b), 669 (1976). 636 F.2d at
164. The General Motors court held that NIOSH properly used its statutorily authorized
subpoena powers to obtain data for its health hazard evaluation. Id. at 165.







the district court issue a protective order when enforcing NIOSH's sub-
poena to ensure that the records would not be improperly disclosed.
2
Although the General Motors court duly applied the Whalen ade-
quate security test, the court failed to note the difference in the breadth
of information sought in Whalen and that in General Motors. Whalen
concerned disclosure of a limited amount of private information." In
General Motors, NIOSH sought access to complete identifiable medical
records." The Sixth Circuit should have considered whether the data
sought by NIOSH in General Motors was more sensitive than the infor-
mation required in Whalen and thus entitled to greater protection.
In May 1981, the Secretary of Labor issued regulations authorizing
OSHA and NIOSH access without employee consent to complete employee
exposure"5 and medical records.6 In United Steelworkers of America v.
Marshall, 7 the D.C. Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the regula-
tions. 8 The court found that the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSH Act) required explicitly that OSHA and NIOSH have access to
employee medical records.79 Relying exclusively on Whalen, the D.C. Cir-
cuit found that OSHA's regulations did not violate employees' constitu-
72 Id.
1 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977) (statute required names and addresses of
patients receiving prescription drugs that have unlawful market).
' 636 F.2d at 164.
Employee exposure records contain information concerning employee exposure to
toxic substances or harmful physical agents. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(b)(5) (1980).
78 29 C.F.R. § 1913.10 (1980). In addition to authorizing OSHA and NIOSH access to
employee exposure and medical records, the OSHA regulations also give employees access
to their own employee exposure and medical records. Id at § 1910.20(a) (1980). See note 16
supra (some states do not allow a patient access to his own medical records). See generally
Kaiser, supra note 9; Richards & Rathburn, Medical Records: OSHA Regulations & The
Practicing Attorney, 43 TEx. BAR J. 944 (Oct. 1980).
7 No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980).
" Id., slip op. at 90-91. The D.C. Circuit noted the OSHA regulations allegedly
threatened the privacy rights of the individual employee and not the industries that are
challenging the regulations. Id., slip op. at 90. Nevertheless, the court held that the in-
dustries have standing because the court considered the regulations lawful and thus did not
want to dispose of the constitutional issue on jurisdictional grounds. Id.
Id., slip op. at 91. The Steelworkers court cited §§ 655(b)(7) and 657(c)(1) (1976) as the
sections of the OSH Act that require that OSHA and NIOSH have unrestricted access to
employee medical records. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(7), 657(c)(1) (1976). The fifth clause of §
655(b)(7) provides that when medical examinations are conducted for research initiated by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of
Health and Human Services will have access to the medical records that result from the ex-
amination. Id. Section 657(c)(1) requires that an employer make, keep, preserve and make
available to the Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Health and Human Services records
prescribed by regulation regarding the company's activities. Id. § 657(c)(1) (1976). The
statute does not require a company to keep medical records. 45 Fed. Reg. 35253 (1980).
Nevertheless, if an employer voluntarily keeps medical records -on his employees, the
records must be kept for the duration of the employee's employment with the company plus
30 years. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20(d)(30) (1980).
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tional rights." The court did not base its reasoning, however, on
-Whalen's adequate security test. Rather, the D.C. Circuit based its deci-
sion on the Whalen Court's proof-of-harm test and its police powers
test."
The D.C. Circuit noted that the Whalen Court relied only in part on
the adequacy of the statute's security provisions to find the plaintiffs'
privacy interests were not violated. The Whalen Court stated explicitly
that it was not creating a standard based on New York's security provi-
sions to determine the constitutionality of other government collection
systems of confidential information.2 The Steelworkers court found that
the Whalen Court, instead, relied on a proof-of-harm test." The D.C. Cir-
cuit recognized that the Whalen Court questioned the adequacy of the
statute's security provisions to aid in weighing "concrete proof" of im-
mediate or threatened harm from disclosure of the plaintiffs medical in-
formation.8 The Steelworkers court stated that in absence of concrete
proof of harm a court should not speculate that unwarranted disclosure
will result by government collection systems.85 Thus, the D.C. Circuit
adopted the rationale of prior judicial opinions regarding the storage of
confidential information, and demanded that the plaintiffs present proof
of immediate harm to support the court's finding that a constitutional
violation existed." Because the plaintiffs could not demonstrate im-
mediate harm from disclosure of employee medical records, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held that the employees' privacy interests were not violated by
OSHA's access to the records."
In addition to the proof-of-harm test, the D.C. Circuit employed
Whalen's police powers test to determine whether the government need-
ed unlimited access to identifiable medical records.88 The court found
OSHA's need for unlimited access to identifiable records reasonable.8
The D.C. Circuit noted that OSHA needed not only general information
on employee health but also specific information on individual employees
to ensure that no employee exposed to toxic substances suffered any ille-
gal exposure.' Thus, the Steelworkers court held that OSHA regulations
No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98, 601-02 (1977);
text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
1, Id slip op. at 91-92; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98, 601-02 (1977); text ac-
companying notes 33-36 supra.
No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91.
Id., slip op. at 91.
Id, slip op. at 91; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601-02 (1977); text accompanying
notes 34-36 supra.
No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91.
Id., see text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91.
Id., slip op. at 91-92.
I&
o Id The OSH Act requires that the Secretary promulgate occupational safety and
health standards dealing with toxic materials and harmful agents so that an employee will
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further satisfied the requirements of Whalen because the regulations
were a reasonable 'exercise of governmental police power exhibiting
responsibility over public welfare."
Whether the D.C. Circuit should have relied on Whalen to reach its
decision is questinable. The issue the Whalen Court considered was
whether the individual's privacy rights were violated by the possibility
of future disclosure.2 In Steelworkers, the issue before the court was
whether the individuals' privacy rights were violated by the possibility
privacy interest by authorizing unlimited access to identifiable records. 3
Thus, the D.C. Circuit was not confronted in Steelworkers with whether
an individual's rights will be violated in the future by an unsubstan-
tiated possibility of unwarranted disclosure. Rather, the court should
have considered whether OSHA's present ability to have unlimited ac-
cess to identifiable records is violative of the individual's privacy in-
terest.
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,9 the Third
Circuit joined the precedent set by the Sixth Circuit holding that
NIOSH's unconsented access to employee medical records did not violate
employees' constitutional privacy rights. 5 NIOSH brought action in the
Third Circuit to enforce an administrative subpoena duces tecum for
employee medical records gathered by Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion (Westinghouse)." NIOSH sought access to the records to aid in a
study it was conducting at a Westinghouse plant concerning the effects
on employees of certain chemicals used at the plant.' Westinghouse
refused to release the medical records without employee consent and
without a written governmental assurance that the contents of the
not be subject to prolonged exposure to these substances and suffer material impairment.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
The regulations authorizing OSHA's access to employee medical records state that
OSHA examination and use of employee medical records should be limited to that informa-
tion needed to accomplish the purpose for access. 29 C.F.R. § 1913.10(a) (1980). The records
must be identifiable by employee, however. I& § 1913.10(b) (1980). Moreover, the limited in-
formation provision does not prohibit OSHA from obtaining access to complete medical
records if the agency determines complete records are relevant to its statutorily authorized
inquiries. See 29 C.F.R. § 1913.10(d)(2(i) (1980).
" No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977); text ac-
companying notes 33, 35 supra. In addition to finding OSHA's access to identifiable
employee medical records reasonable, the D.C. Circuit also determined that an employee
consent requirement would be administratively burdensome. No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92;
see text accompanying notes 120-30 infra (discussion of administrative burden of a consent
requirement).
', Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600-04 (1977).
No. 79-1048, slip op. at 90.
638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
,5 Id at 580; see General Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d 163, 166 (6th
Cir. 1980); text accompanying notes 63-72 supra.
m 638 F.2d at 573.
" Id. at 572-73.
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records would not be disclosed to the public.98 The company contended
that unconsented release of the medical records would violate its
employees' constitutional privacy interests.9
The Third Circuit developed a balancing test based on Detroit
Edison to determine if the employees' interest in maintaining confiden-
tiality of their medical records outweighed NIOSH's interest in access to
the records pursuant to an occupational disease investigation. ' Factors
the Westinghouse court considered in deciding whether an intrusion into
an individual's privacy was justified were the types of records re-
quested, the information the records did or might contain, the potential
harm to the employees from disclosure, and the adequacy of the safe-
guards to prevent unauthorized disclosure.'' The court also considered
the government's need for access, and whether there is an express
statutory mandate authorizing the government's need for access.",
Although the Westinghouse court acknowledged that an employee's
medical record might contain highly sensitive data,' the Third Circuit
found that Westinghouse did not demonstrate that the medical records
sought were of such a high degree of sensitivity that the intrusion would
be severe or cause an employee to suffer adverse effects from disclosure
to NIOSH.104 Moreover, the court determined that NIOSH's interest in
the medical records was justified since the records were relevant and
necessary to NIOSH's statutorily authorized research on the effects of
" Id at 783. NIOSH completed its evaluation without the records but sought access to
the records to compare the allergic symptoms and other information gathered during the
study with earlier information gathered by the employer. Id.
" Id. The Third Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of Westinghouse's standing to
assert its employees' privacy interests. I& at 573-74. The court held that Westinghouse had
the necessary "concrete adverseness" to bring the suit since the subpoena was directed to
Westinghouse and thus its failure to comply would place Westinghouse in contempt. Id at
574. Moreover, the Third Circuit noted the ongoing employee-employer relationship and
concluded that a decision adverse to Westinghouse's claim might adversely affect the
employee's candor in revealing necessary medical information. Id Further, the court
recognized that in absence of notice to the employees of the subpoena, no one other than
Westinghouse would likely raise the privacy claim. Id.; see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(to have standing plaintiff must have personal stake in outcome of litigation to assure con-
crete adverseness).
10 Id. at 578. The Westinghouse court found that the employees' interest in maintain-
ing the confidentiality of their medical records fell under one of the privacy interests
enumerated in Whalen, an individual's interest "in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."
Id. at 577; see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-601 (1977); text accompanying note 4 supra
(Whalen privacy interests). The court noted that the medical information requested by
NIOSH was more extensive than that requested in Whalen and therefore could be more
revealing if disclosed. Thus the Third Circuit held the records fell within one of the zones of
privacy. Id
" 638 F.2d at 578-80.
102 1&
10 Id. at 580-81.
,0' Id at 579.
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certain chemicals on employees." 5 Further, the Third Circuit identified
sufficient public interest in disclosure of the employee's medical records
to NIOSH. The court recognized that past, present and future employees
at the plant, and the public at large have an interest in their occupational
safety and health."0 8 Finally, the court evaluated the security provisions
NIOSH provided to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information
and found the safeguards adequate. ' Thus, the Third Circuit concluded
that NIOSH's interest in the medical records outweighed the employees'
general privacy interest in the confidentiality of company-gathered
medical information.10 8
The Westinghouse court carefully articulated the factors it con-
sidered when balancing NIOSH's interest in access to the records
against the employees' privacy interest in their medical information.
The court erroneously assumed, however, that because an individual
employee's medical record contains mostly results of routine testing, the
records are not of a highly sensitive nature."9 All medical records con-
tain some amount of "routine testing.""' Nevertheless, the court should
not dismiss as insignificant the employee's interest in the remaining in-
formation which may contain sensitive data.
Although OSHA and NIOSH sometimes must have access to em-
ployee medical records to perform their statutory duties, the courts
have not considered adequately whether the agencies' interest in
unlimited access to complete and identifiable medical records is suffi-
cient to override an individual's constitutional privacy right.' None of
105 1&.
10 Id
O Id at 579-80. Westinghouse contended that the security provisions were inadequate
to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the medical information since the statute authorized
the use of outside contractors for data processing and analysis. Id. at 580. Westinghouse
also challenged the adequacy of the security provisions alleging that the statute contains
neither the means to police compliance with the provisions nor adequate sanctions for un-
warranted disclosure. The Third Circuit found, however, that the safeguards were suffi-
cient since the employees' names and addresses were removed before contractors had ac-
cess and since the contract bound the contractors to retain the confidentiality of the
records. IR.
18 Id. The Third Circuit held that Westinghouse must comply with NIOSH's subpoena.
I& at 581-82. The court recognized, however, that some of the medical records might contain
information not limited to employment-related concerns and might be of a highly sensitive
nature. Id. at 580-81. The Third Circuit proposed, therefore, the NIOSH give prior notice to
the employee so that the employee would have the opportunity to raise a personal privacy
claim. Id
'" Id. at 579. The Westinghouse court defined routine tests as x-rays, blood tests,
pulmonary function tests, hearing tests, visual tests and other testing of a similar nature.
Id. The court stated that although routine testing data may be considered private, it is not
sensitive. Id.
11I See id. at 580-81 (employee consult company physician voluntarily on broad spec-
trum of health matters); see generally JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS,
ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1973).
"' See generally Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLImi. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
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the circuits has considered sufficiently the possibility of less intrusive
alternatives."' The Detroit Edison Court considered requiring employee
consent as an alternative to allowing the union direct access to employee
psychological data."' The union, as do OSHA and NIOSH, has employee
welfare as its goal."" Similar to the OSH Act, the NLRA allows a union
access to any material relevant to its statutorily authorized inquiries."'
Nevertheless, the Court held that requiring consent forms from the
employees was a reasonable alternative to unauthorized access. 6 Thus,
the Detroit Edison Court demonstrated that the constitutional right to
privacy in medical records should not be easily overridden.
As an alternative to requiring OSHA and NIOSH to seek consent
from employees before the agents can have medical records access, a
court could consider the possibility of whether excising the information
pertinent to the agencies' study would satisfy the agencies' interest."'
For example, in Westinghouse and General Motors, NIOSH was conduct-
ing studies of chemicals and industrial manufacturing processes at the
defendant companies' plants that were causing allergic reactions and
skin diseases in the employees."' Since NIOSH's inquiries were limited,
the Third and Sixth Circuits should have determined whether NIOSH
could have conducted its studies effectively with relevant excised sec-
tions of an individual's record, thus satisfying both the interests of the
employee and NIOSH without demanding complete records."9
An issue closely related to whether NIOSH should be required tb ob-
tain an individual's consent before gaining access to employee medical
records is whether a court can dismiss the possibility of a consent re-
"' See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 319-20 (1979) (union had reasonable
alternative to unauthorized access); Divison of Medical Quality, Bd. of Med. Quality
Assur., 92 Cal. App. 3d 689, 681, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (1979) (if state medical board is to
have access to medical records, it must be by least intrusive manner).
' 440 U.S. at 319-20.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
,I 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); see United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048,
slip op. at 91 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980); 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(b)(7), 657(c)(1) (1976).
116 440 U.S. at 319-20.
17 See id. (reasonable alternatives to unauthorized access); United Steelworkers of
America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980). The Steel-
workers court considered whether OSHA needed unlimited access to employee medi-
cal records. No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92. The court interpreted "unlimited" to encom-
pass both access to "complete" medical records and unconsented access to the records. Id.
slip op. at 91-92. The D.C. Circuit determined that OSHA needed access to complete medical
records because the agency needed specific information on individual employees. I&., slip op.
at 91. Further, the court concluded that to require consent from millions of employees would
be administratively burdensome. Id., slip op. at 91-92; see text accompanying notes 120-130
infra (discussion of consent as administrative burden).
"I United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 572-73 (3d Cir. 1980);
General Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d 163, 164 (6th Cir. 1980).
I' See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 319-20 (1979); text accompanying
notes 112-116 supra (issue of reasonable alternatives to unauthorized access).
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quirement as being administratively burdensome. '° In Steelworkers, the
court rejected the possibility of obtaining consent forms from each
employee before an employer released that employee's health record.
21
The D.C. Circuit reasoned that to seek consent from each of millions of
workers would be administratively burdensome. OSHA seldom re-
quires medical records access, however."= OSHA's primary use of
medical records access is for health hazard evaluations.12' Because the
scope of the evaluations is limited to specific groups of employees exposed
to the toxic chemicals under investigation, OSHA should have no need
for access to every employee's medical record in every plant that is sub-
ject to OSHA regulations. Thus the Steelworkers court improperly re-
jected a consent requirement as administratively burdensome by assum-
ing that OSHA would have to seek permission from each of millions of
workers.1'
In General Motors, the company distributed consent forms to 704 of
its employees in response to NIOSH's request for access to employee
medical records.2 Of this number, 490 failed to execute a release of their
records.'2 The General Motors record does not indicate whether in-
dividuals did not sign the release because of fear of employer reprisal,
because of neglect, or because the employees simply did not want the
government to have access. If the employee did not authorize a release
because of fear of employer reprisal, the employee's decision not to sign
the release was not volitional.2 8 If the lack of consent is a result of
employee apathy, the employee's neglect would unnecessarily interfere
with the agencies' safety and health inspections and evaluations.12'9 A
consent form could be designed, however, to give automatic consent
unless within a specified time period the individual objects to the release
of his medical records. If an employee does not authorize release of his
medical records because he does not want the government to interfere in
his private affairs, the employee may be justified in his refusal. An in-
dividual has a constitutional privacy right in keeping the records con-
1 See United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 15, 1980) (employee consent requirement would be administratively burdensome);
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1980) (employee con-
sent requirenent may impose great impediment on NIOSH's ability to carry out statutory
mandate).
"' No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92.
'1 45 Fed. Reg. 35285 (1980).
124 Id.
11 See No. 79-1048, slip op. at 91-92.
"= General Motors Corp. v. Director of NIOSH, 636 F.2d 163, 164 (6th Cir. 1980).
127 I1&
See generally Shrank, supra note 8.
12 See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1980) (con-
sent requirement may impose impediment to NIOSH's ability to carry out its statutory
mandate).
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fidential.5 ° In any event, although the reason is not clear why 490 Gen-
eral Motors employees refused to authorize release of their records, the
percentage that did not sign is significant enough to question whether
the administrative burden of seeking consent is justified.
Although limited government access to medical records long has
been accepted as necessary to the public welfare and not per se violative
of an individual's privacy interest,"' courts should view more strictly
unlimited government access to complete medical records. Entire medi-
cal records, whether or not gathered by an employer, are more revealing
of an individual's personal details than the limited information required
by a mandatory reporting statute."' Thus, courts should be less reluc-
tant to hold that the government's unlimited access to complete medical
records i violative of an individual's constitutional privacy right.
PATRICIA ELIZABETH SINSKEY
"I See id. (employees' interest in privacy concerning sensitive data will not always be
outweighed by NIOSH's need for such material). See generally Rosen, Signing Away
Medical Privacy, 3 Civ. LIB. REV. 54 (1976).
"' See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977); text accompanying notes 19-24 supra
(mandatory reporting laws). Cf. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 570,
577 (3d Cir. 1980) (entire medical records are more revealing than patient identification re-
quirement considered in Whalen).
'" See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (en-
tire medical records are more revealing than patient identification requirement considered
in Whalen).
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